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Abstract
ISIS has run the most effective social media marketing campaign in
history. In fact, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) market their
ideology and organizations to a global audience in ways that rival even
the savviest of conventional organizations. However, applying marketing
theory and methodology to study VEOs has not been done to date for the
security community. Thus, the goal of the present effort is to use a novel
lens used to apply the marketing strategies of conventional, for-profit
organizations to examine the impact of VEO reputation and legitimacy on
VEO performance. We coded tactics used by VEOs such as ISIS to
establish a strong brand reputation, and examined the relationship
between branding strategies and markers of performance (e.g.,
recruitment and fundraising) using a sample of 60 historically notable
VEOs spanning a variety of ideologies, cultures, and periods of peak
performance. The primary contribution of studying such a diverse sample
of VEOs is the identification of how branding strategies can predict
recruitment of talented personnel, financial sources, and organizational
capacity for violence. Two key findings discussed are (1) VEOs market
and differentiate themselves via malevolently innovative attacks, and (2)
even negatively-toned media coverage is related to their long-term
fundraising viability.
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Introduction 
Over the span of one year, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has 
become one of the most recognized terrorist organizations globally, and a 
legitimate rival and alternative to al-Qaida Central.1  The former affiliate 
separated from al-Qaida in 2014 following publicized disagreements between 
the leaders.  Traditionally, once a parent organization disavows an affiliated 
organization, the former affiliate suffers in both performance and legitimacy.2 
ISIS, however, has shown steady and sustainable increases in performance 
and reputation over the past year.  Since the split from al-Qaida, ISIS has 
used strategic marketing to publicize high-impact and innovative attacks 
(such as the video-taped beheadings of journalists) with low cost to the 
organization.3  These tactics have led to numerous outcomes, such as strong 
alliances with other violent extremist organizations, daily global media 
coverage, recruiting large numbers of local and foreign fighters, establishing 
strong and sustainable fundraising lines, and accomplishing organizational 
objectives. 
 
The success of ISIS over the past year highlights a critical aspect of 
performance in violent extremist organizations (VEO) that has yet to be 
empirically examined: Do marketing and branding frameworks that illustrate 
successful strategies in conventional organizations apply to VEOs?  This 
question is timely, given the increasing VEO use of technology and media to 
communicate with a global audience.  In the following sections, the article 
briefly outlines how marketing and branding strategies influence performance 
in conventional organizations, and apply the frameworks to a sample of 
historically-notable VEOs using a historiometric methodology and a 
psychometric content-coding scheme.  The article then discusses the 
implications of these results, with emphasis on counterterrorism. 
 
Violent Extremist Organizations 
The term “violent extremist organization” (VEO) is used to describe a 
collection of individuals who prescribe to an ideological or belief-based 
                                                     
1 Charles Lister, “Profiling the Islamic State,” Brookings, December 1, 2014, available at: 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2014/12/profiling-islamic-state-lister. 
2 Randi Lunnan and Sven A. Haugland, “Predicting and Measuring Alliance Performance: 
A Multidimensional Analysis,” Journal of Strategic Management 29:5 (2007): 545-556. 
3 Gina S. Ligon, Mackenzie Harms, John Crowe, Leif Lundmark, and Pete Simi, “ISIL: 
Branding, leadership Culture, and Lethal Attraction,” START, November 2014, available 
at: http://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/isil-branding-leadership-culture-and-
lethal-attraction. 
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mission and engage in violence in order to execute that mission.4  Due to the 
covert nature of their activities, VEOs often have a degree of ambiguity in 
their organizational boundaries.5  Despite this ambiguity, VEOs share many 
characteristics with more conventional organizations, particularly within their 
core leadership and top members.6  For instance, VEOs can be classified by 
their organizational features, such as hierarchy, formalization, and 
centralization, as well as in terms of performance, such as financing, 
recruitment opportunities, and innovation.   
 
In addition to features like structure, tactics, and operations, VEOs are similar 
to other types of organizations in that their complexity, unique 
characteristics, and continual evolution make it difficult to study them in a 
controlled setting.  Despite these limitations, there is a critical need to study 
organizational trends and frameworks across VEOs in an empirical way, in 
order to better predict strategic outcomes following counterterrorism efforts 
and deterrence operations.7  Consequently, similar techniques employed to 
study conventional organizations—using secondary, archival data and other 
historical records suitable for these distinct populations of interest—can be 
applied to VEOs. 
 
VEO Marketing: Brand and Reputation  
In addition to methodological and data collection techniques, the similarities 
between VEOs and conventional organizations offer opportunities to use the 
robust body of literature on organizational behavior garnered from businesses 
and non-profits to develop and test models of performance in VEOs.  One 
such area that has shown strong predictive value in the private sector is 
research illustrating how organizations market themselves and establish a 
unique brand with implications for firm legitimacy, funding, human capital, 
and innovation.8  The ways in which organizations differentiate themselves 
                                                     
4 Gina S. Ligon, Pete Simi, Mackenzie Harms, and Daniel J. Harris, “Putting the ‘O’ in 
VEO: What Makes an Organization,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 6:1 (2013): 110-
134. 
5 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
6 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: 
Pathways Toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20:3 (2008): 415-433. 
7 Edwin Bakker, “Forecasting Terrorism: The Need for a More Systematic Approach,” 
Journal of Strategic Security 5:4 (2012): 69-84. 
8 David L. Deephouse, “Media Reputation as a Strategic Resource: An Integration of Mass 
Communication and Resource-Based Theories,” Journal of Management 26:6 (2000): 
1091-1112. 
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from competitors in terms of their brand influence perception among 
stakeholders and competitors.9   
 
An organization’s brand can be thought of as its personality—the stronger or 
more distinct an organization’s brand is, the more likely it is that marketing 
and promotional efforts will increase the organization’s reputation, which in 
turn increases other facets of performance.10  Branding is achieved through 
engaging in innovative marketing campaigns and strategic actions that attract 
media attention, publicizing the organization’s mission and success, and 
differentiating them from competitors.11  As the ISIS example suggests, VEOs 
with similar ideologies may still have remarkably distinct brands that 
differentiate them as unique from competing VEOs (e.g., al-Qaida). 
Accordingly, marketing frameworks offer valuable theoretical support for 
understanding the interplay between branding, reputation, and 
organizational sustainability in VEOs.  
 
In more conventional organizations, crafting a successful brand via media 
coverage and innovation can lead to third-party endorsements (e.g., 
organizations see a surge in applicants and investments after recognition in 
Forbes Magazine as a desirable organization via their ranking system), which 
build a strong reputation for the firm.12  Firm reputation and legitimacy 
garnered through third-party endorsements results in sustainable funding 
lines with banks and investors, access to desirable markets, and opportunities 
to co-brand with other notable organizations.13  Co-branding or aligning with 
other organizations is an important outcome because it leads to wider global 
influence, larger constituencies of stakeholders, and increases access to 
resources such as training or human capital.  In addition, stable funding lines 
increase the organization’s ability to execute successful marketing campaigns 
in the future.  Therefore, marketing constructs found in conventional 
organizational science literature are important to understanding VEO 
performance because the cyclical nature of branding, reputation, and 
performance tends to increase sustainability over time.  
 
                                                     
9 David L. Deephouse and Suzanne M. Carter, “An Examination of Differences between 
Organizational Legitimacy and Organizational Reputation,” Journal of Management 
Studies 42:2 (2005): 329-360. 
10 Volina P. Rindova, Antoaneta P. Petkova, and Suresh Kotha, “Standing Out: How New 
Firms in Emerging Markets Build Reputation,” Strategic Organization 5 (Feb 2007): 31-
70. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Charles Fombrun and Mark Shanley, “What’s in a Name? Reputation Building and 
Corporate Strategy,” Academy of Management 33:2 (1990): 233-258. 
13 Ibid. 
Ligon et al.: Lethal Brands
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
30 
 
 
 
Malevolent Innovation 
Firms conventionally build their brands and reputations based on innovative 
promotional efforts to attract attention to their products and services.  
However, given the destructive nature of VEOs, it is unclear how their 
violence impacts organizational brand and reputation.  In a recent model by 
Gill and Horgan, malevolent creativity is described as a particularly useful 
index of performance and may have implications for understanding how 
organizations such as ISIS have rapidly become a global threat.14  While 
traditional VEO performance is studied almost exclusively in terms of 
lethality, that metric does not capture the full range of outcomes that have 
implications for early warning signs of later VEO destruction.15  For instance, 
as the recent Boston Marathon bombing suggests, lethality alone cannot fully 
capture the impact of VEO performance and effectiveness.  The bombing 
resulted in three fatalities, which is a relatively low number of casualties when 
compared to other high-impact terrorist attacks.  However, the symbolic 
nature of the target and attack were psychologically destructive to the target 
audience and resulted in a renewed attention to the Jihadi brand.  This 
suggests that lethality alone may not be the only index that should describe 
VEO performance.  
 
Using a marketing framework, however, may link how malevolent innovation 
(i.e., novel methods of destruction to people, property, and symbols of the 
target group) results in greater organizational performance.  Moreover, it is 
widely known that one aspect of creating a strong brand in conventional 
organizations is the innovation that firms use to draw attention from potential 
recruits, customers, and investors.  For example, brand managers spend 
resources to creatively market their firm to stand out from others in their 
industry (e.g., Coke versus Pepsi advertisements and public relation 
campaigns).  Given that VEOs operate in a violent domain, it is likely that 
their innovation must also demonstrate increasingly novel and sophisticated 
attacks to differentiate themselves in the marketplace of ideas.  How that 
malevolence relates to performance has not been tested empirically to date.  
 
 
                                                     
14 Paul Gill, John Horgan, Samuel T. Hunter, and Lily D. Cushenbery, “Malevolent 
Creativity in Terrorist Organizations,” Journal of Creative Behavior 47:2 (2013): 125-151. 
15 Victor Asal and Karl Rethemeyer, “The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures 
and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks,” The Journal of Politics 70 (April 2008): 437-449. 
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VEO Performance 
Relatively novel attacks such as the Boston marathon bombing and the video-
taped beheadings of American journalists by ISIS tend to attract global media 
attention, both positive and negative, that may create the same impact on the 
organization’s reputation and brand as a high-lethality attack.  The media 
coverage allows VEOs to craft the narrative supporting their attack to further 
establish their brand and spread their ideological message to potential 
sympathizers and constituents.  In addition, for VEOs to draw desirable 
recruits such as foreign fighters or individuals with specialized skills, media 
coverage places their brand foremost in the minds of potential members and 
has been shown to influence radicalism.16  Similar to how marketing 
campaigns are designed to establish brand loyalty among consumers, VEOs 
execute innovative attacks as campaigns to draw media coverage and attract 
membership and potential financiers.  This suggests that malevolent 
innovation may be a critical early indicator of VEO marketing (e.g., third-
party endorsements, opportunities to co-brand, reputation) that may increase 
the legitimacy and desirability of a VEO in the eyes of the potential recruits 
and funders.   
 
Present Study 
Applying marketing constructs such as branding (e.g., malevolent innovation, 
media attention) and reputation (e.g., external legitimacy, third-party 
endorsements) to examine VEO performance in terms of recruiting and 
fundraising has not been done to date.  Thus, the goal of the present effort 
drives three research questions:  
 
Research Question 1: Do elements of organizational branding and 
reputation extend to the domain of Violent Extremist organizations?  
 
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between malevolent 
innovation with other branding indices (e.g., media tone) and reputation 
indices (e.g., organizational legitimacy) in the context of violence?  
 
Research Question 3: What is the relationship between marketing efforts 
and recruitment of talented members and revenue sources?  
 
 
                                                     
16 Robin L. Thompson, “Radicalization and the Use of Social Media,” Journal of Strategic 
Security 4:4 (2011): 167-190. 
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Method 
This research employed a historiometric method developed as part of the 
Leadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) 
project, dedicated to examining predictors of violence and performance of 
VEOs.17  Historiometry is a method that transforms publicly available, 
qualitative historical records and applies quantitative analyses to measure 
relationships in notable populations that may be otherwise difficult to study.18   
The steps followed to develop a psychometrically-validated content coding 
scheme, to gather and code the data using benchmarked rating scales, and to 
test the hypothesized relationships are briefly outlined in the following 
sections. 
 
Sample 
The sample was comprised of sixty historically notable VEOs, distributed 
across regions (western and non-western) and ideologies.  The sample was 
also diverse in organizational structure (e.g., hierarchical and cell-based) and 
size.  Organizations were excluded if their height of peak performance 
occurred prior to 1980, to ensure that sufficient data on the media strategies 
of the organizations were available.  Height of peak performance was 
determined according to consistency of performance over time (e.g., attacks), 
largest growth in terms of membership or financing, and relative stability of 
organizational structure and leadership.  Using three subject matter experts 
with over ten years of experience in the field of extremist studies, we 
identified organizations that met criteria outlined to capture a wide array of 
VEOs (e.g., Tamil Tigers, Hezbollah, FARC).  Though the sample may be 
considered small relative to research within other domains, the sample was 
sufficiently diverse to examine whether the hypothesized relationships 
between branding and performance are consistent across ideological groups 
who employ violence to execute their mission.19 
 
Data Gathering and Coding 
Doctoral students trained in industrial and organizational psychology and 
extremist organizations gathered academic, government, and media sources 
                                                     
17 Gina S. Ligon, “Organizational Determinants of Violence and Performance,” Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, available at: 
http://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/organizational-determinants-violence-
and-performance 
18 Gina S. Ligon, Daniel J. Harris, and Samuel T. Hunter, “Quantifying Leader Lives: 
What Historiometric Approaches can Tell Us,” The Leadership Quarterly 23:6 (2013): 
1104-1133. 
19 Brian J. Phillips, “What is a Terrorist Group? Conceptual Issues and Empirical 
Implications,” Terrorism and Political Violence 27:2 (2015): 225-242. 
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to gather qualitative information about the marketing strategies (e.g., 
branding and reputation efforts) and the performance indices (e.g., recruiting 
characteristics and fundraising sources) of each organization.  In accordance 
with best practices for coding of secondary sources, the research teams 
divided into groups devoted to gathering marketing strategy data or 
performance data to prevent mono-source and common method bias.  The 
search tactics were standardized across researchers to ensure that any 
gathered data were from reputable sources and that sufficient data were 
gathered. Each organization was then de-identified so that coders in 
subsequent steps were not familiar with the groups.  
 
A psychometric content coding scheme was developed using behaviorally 
anchored rating scales (BARS) and objective indices of performance to 
measure constructs related to branding and organizational behavior.  
Constructs coded as BARS were measured on 5-point Likert-type scales with 
benchmark exemplars for low, medium, and high performance indicators.20 
All data were then coded by three trained raters and assessed for interrater 
agreement according to within-group variance (rwg) and intraclass 
correlations (ICCs).  Agreement was above .80 on all constructs across raters, 
which is the accepted criterion for research.21 
 
Branding Measures 
The most notable way for VEOs to brand themselves and attract media 
attention is by executing attacks that are innovative, as well as highly effective 
at psychologically influencing secondary and tertiary targets (i.e., some 
attacks induce a high degree of fear to those not directly involved in the 
attack).  Thus, we assessed malevolent innovation by rating attacks from 
VEOs to the extent to which an organization uses behaviors or actions that are 
cruel or excessively violent, above and beyond their mission and relative to 
other VEOs within their historical context.  For instance, the video-taped 
beheadings made popular by al-Qaida in Iraq under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 
(and later, ISIS) show an element of psychological cruelty that supersedes 
attacks measured solely by lethality.  To assess this particular aspect of 
performance, we used the Global Terrorism Database to sample attacks from 
each organization during its peak performance period.22 
                                                     
20 Debnath, Sukumar C., Brian Lee, and Sudhir Tandon. “Fifty Years and Going Strong: 
What Makes Behaviorally Anchored Ratings Scales So Perennial as an Appraisal 
Method?” International Journal of Business and Social Science 6:2 (2015): 16-25. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan, “Global Terrorism Database,” Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism, available at: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 
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Using procedures outlined by the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) 
of best practices for measuring branding and reputation via media, the 
prominence of the organization includes indices of branding and promotional 
efforts that refer to the organization’s global status, and are measured using 
several 5-point Likert-type BARS.23  Media exposure refers to the amount of 
publicity an organization receives globally (both Western and non-Western 
media outlets).  This construct was coded using a stratified sampling 
technique to capture news sources from both Western and non-Western 
media outlets, and then benchmarked proportionately within the sample to 
reflect low, mid, and high amounts of media exposure.  Media tone is 
comprised of two scales measuring the extent to which the tone of media 
coverage regarding the groups is positive or negative, respectively. 
 
Reputation Measures 
Organizations that are more innovative and establish a unique brand are 
expected to have a stronger reputation, as measured by several BARS.  
External legitimacy refers to third-party endorsements that reflect the global 
threat an organization poses, and is indexed by the number of countries 
designating that VEO as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (i.e., FTO 
designation), which has been used in nascent research as an index of global 
endorsements.24  Comparative reputation refers to the reputation and 
legitimacy of an organization relative to competing VEOs (e.g., there are a 
number of Jihadist organizations, but some are considered to be more 
sophisticated than others, comparatively).  Cultural reputation refers to the 
perception of an organization within their regional population (e.g., Boko 
Haram is considered a strong force within Nigeria).  Finally, co-branding 
refers to the extent to which the organization publicizes alliances with other 
organizations within their ideology. 
  
Performance Measures 
As establishing a unique brand and strong reputation is most likely to 
influence members as well as investors, two important aspects of performance 
we examined are recruiting and fundraising.  Recruitment strategies refer to 
                                                     
23 David Michaelson and Sandra Macleod, “The Application of ‘Best Practices’ in Public 
Relations and Evaluation Systems,” Public Relations Journal 1:1 (2007): 1-14. 
24 U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” updated March 2015, 
available at: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm; Ethem Ilbiz and 
Benjamin L. Curtis, “Trendsetters, Trend Followers, and Individual Players: Obtaining 
Global Counterterror Actor Types from proscribed Terror Lists,” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 38:1 (2015): 39-61. 
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the novelty and effectiveness of strategies used to recruit potential 
sympathizers and members, particularly those with desirable attributes.  
Organizations rated high on novelty use diverse messaging and tactics to 
recruit specific members of interest, such as al-Qaida in the Arabian 
Peninsula’s (AQAP) magazines targeting female Muslims or Westerners with 
access to desirable targets, or the Hammerskins’ use of their record label and 
racist rock concerts to recruit youth.25  Organizations high on effectiveness 
use tactics that are highly successful at recruiting desirable members (those 
with access to resources, specialized skills, or other desirable traits).   
 
Marketing should also relate to fundraising efficiency.  Short-term 
fundraising refers to strategies that have an immediate fundraising return for 
the organization, such as bank robberies or successful ransom demands.  
Long-term fundraising refers to sustainable fundraising strategies that lead 
to income for the organization over time, such as legitimate business or 
membership dues.  Fundraising novelty refers to the diversity and innovation 
an organization uses to raise funds, and was assessed by measuring each 
fundraising stream on a Likert scale for creativity.  
 
Results 
In order to examine how branding and reputation may influence the threat 
and success of VEOs, the authors conducted a series of descriptive statistics 
and correlations among indices of branding, reputation, and performance.  To 
investigate research questions one and two, proposing that relationships 
between malevolent innovation, branding, and reputation found in 
conventional organizations are also predictive in VEOs, we examined the 
intercorrelations among analogous indices (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Intercorrelations between Indices of Branding and 
Reputation 
 
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Branding          
1 Malevolent  
Innovation 
2.83 1.39       
 
2 Media 2.97 1.52 .60**       
                                                     
25 Esther Solis Al-Tabaa, “Targeting a Female Audience: American Muslim Women’s 
Perceptions of al-Qaida Propaganda,” Journal of Strategic Security 6:3 (2013): 10-21; 
Simi, Pete, and Robert Futrell, American Swastika: Inside the White Power Movement’s 
Hidden Spaces of Hate (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010). 
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Exposure 
3 Positive 
Exposure 
2.90 1.40 -.03 .19     
 
4 Negative 
Exposure 
3.42 1.23 .71** .52** -.20    
 
Reputation          
5 External 
Legitimacy 
2.39 1.62 .51** .62** .21 .39**   
 
6 Comparative 3.30 1.32 .62** .69** .20 .57** .61**   
7 Cultural 3.89 1.26 .68** .72** .23† .56** .55** .83**  
8 Co-branding 2.73 1.45 .44** .47** .24† .37** .65** .52** .51** 
Note: N = 60; * p < .05, ** p < .01, † p < .10.  
 
Consistent with marketing frameworks in for-profit organizations, there are 
strong, positive relationships between malevolent innovation, branding and 
media prominence, and perceived reputation against and among comparable 
organizations, as well as within their cultural group.  In addition, malevolent 
innovation, branding, and media prominence were related to higher external 
legitimacy (FTO designations) and co-branding (strategic alliances). 
  
Specifically, VEOs who co-brand with other VEOs and have higher external 
legitimacy from foreign governments tend to also have much more media 
exposure and a higher reputation comparatively and culturally.  VEOs who 
engage in the higher malevolent innovation tend to have stronger branding 
and a more prominent reputation.  For example, when the group Tawhid a’al 
Jihad broadcasted the promotional video of the beheading of Daniel Pearl, 
they gained a great deal of media attention—albeit negative attention (r = .71, 
p < .01), which was followed by at least four countries designating the group 
as an FTO (r = .51, p < .01).  While this may have had an immediate negative 
reaction globally, overtime the media attention that was received increased 
the group’s brand and reputation via legitimacy.  
 
Dissimilar to analogous relationships in conventional organizations, positive 
media exposure has no impact on other facets of branding and reputation, 
while negative media exposure does.  Given that lethality, destruction, and 
malevolence are common tactics of VEOs, this suggests that actions to gain 
negative exposure result in several positive outcomes, such as a stronger 
reputation and more access to valuable allies.  Conversely, efforts by 
organizations such as ISIS to reframe media exposure to highlight positive 
aspects of their organization (e.g., offering food and infrastructure to the local 
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population) likely have little influence on their overall reputation and 
prominence. 
 
Findings related to reputation demonstrate that malevolent innovation has a 
strong relationship with both cultural (r = .62, p < .01) and comparative (r = 
.68, p < .01) reputation.  Thus, VEOs who engage in innovative attacks may 
increase the desirability of other VEOs to align with them.  It may also lead to 
more distinct reputation against other VEOs, as is playing out currently with 
the competition between ISIS and al-Qaida Associated Movements (AQAM).  
Former AQAM affiliates such as Boko Haram have recently pledged loyalty to 
ISIS following their increase in attack innovation, and coinciding with 
AQAM’s overall decrease in innovation and attacks in the past year. 
 
Preliminary analyses among performance metrics suggested that recruiting 
efforts were related to novelty (r = .57, p < .01) and long-term fundraising (r = 
.55, p < .01) for VEOs. However, short-term fundraising is not significantly 
related to either novel or effective recruitment strategies, suggesting that 
VEOs marketing themselves to desirable populations for recruitment may be 
less likely to engage in more one-off fundraising exploits (e.g., bank 
robberies) that may alienate potential members.  Next, to investigate research 
question three, investigating whether marketing frameworks that predict 
performance in conventional organizations also predict performance in VEOs, 
the authors examined the inter-correlations among branding, reputation, and 
performance (creative and effective recruitment and fundraising) (Table 2).  
 
The results suggested that high external legitimacy (i.e., FTO designation by 
foreign governments) is positively related to long-term fundraising, but not 
related to short-term fundraising. This may mean that designating a VEO as 
an FTO hinders short term fundraising and political/ideological goal 
achievement, but may lead to these organizations getting more novel in their 
fundraising efforts, and eventually more sustainable in their business models.  
For example, as ISIS gains legitimacy and controls more territory, they also 
have more sustainable funding avenues available and, therefore, may rely less 
on only short-term or illegal funding activities. 
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Table 2: Intercorrelations between Branding, Reputation, and 
Performance  
 
 Recruitment Fundraising 
 
Novelty Effectiveness Novelty 
Short-
term 
Long-
term  
 2.72 ± 
1.38 
3.35 ± 1.28 
2.90 ± 
1.35 
3.93 ± 
1.16 
3.47 ± 
1.48 
Branding      
  Malevolent  
  Innovation 
.41** .52** .41** .28* .35** 
  Media 
Exposure 
.55** .61** .62** .29* .48** 
  Positive 
Exposure 
.31* .35** .31* .19 .31* 
  Negative 
Exposure 
.38** .16 .38** .16 .43** 
Reputation      
   External  
   Legitimacy 
.45** .44** .45** .21 .59** 
   Comparative .39** .44** .51** .41** .51** 
   Cultural .41** .60** .57** .44** .52** 
   Co-branding .28* .33* .32* .19 .49** 
Note:  Constructs are coded on 5-point, Likert-type scales. N = 60; * p < .05, 
** p < .01. 
 
The results also demonstrate strong relationships between external 
legitimacy, co-branding, and media exposure with novelty and effectiveness of 
recruitment.  What is interesting about this finding is that effective 
recruitment was measured for this effort as the VEO’s capacity to recruit 
specialized, desirable individuals—not just sheer number of people.  This 
suggests that organizations that are seen as more legitimate and have greater 
media attention are also able to better attract more sophisticated members, 
who can later plan specialized attacks that gain greater media exposure down 
the road. One example of this finding is Jemaah Islamiyah, who used its 
relationship with al-Qaida (co-branding) to recruit more specialized weapons 
experts, which may have led to the subsequent successful bombings in Bali.26 
                                                     
26 David Martin Jones, Michael L. R. Smith, and Mark Weeding, “Looking for the Pattern: 
Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia—The Genealogy of a Terror Network,” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 26:6 (2003):443-457. 
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This set of coordinated attacks subsequently led to more prominence and 
attention from foreign states.  
 
Cultural reputation is strongly related to effectiveness in recruiting for 
desirable populations, suggesting that VEOs with a stronger reputation and 
prominence within their culture tend to attract highly skilled individuals 
compared with organizations who have not established a reputation (garnered 
from media coverage of innovative attacks) within their region.  In other 
words, when VEOs are perceived as stronger, more dominant representatives 
of their people’s needs, they are more likely to also have more expert, talented 
members drawn to them.  In support of this, VEOs who engaged in the most 
creative marketing to potential members tended to obtain more financial 
support from investors.  Overall, the results support the research hypothesis 
proposing that marketing frameworks used to predict performance in 
conventional organizations will be predictive in VEOs as well.  The 
implications of these results are discussed in the following section. 
 
Discussion 
A central concern of a VEO is how to grow and maintain the organization—
both in terms of followers and finances.  Recruiting is a central component of 
VEO leader decision making, resulting in a focus on branding, organizational 
legitimacy, and creating a compelling narrative.  Decisions are both made and 
framed in relation to the brand, such as what alliances to endorse, what media 
to use in recruiting, and what statements to make by key figures.  For 
example, ISIS has designated Abu Muhammad al-Adnani as the Chief Media 
Officer, charged with delivering “official” organizational speeches and 
approving media content such as the video Flames of War.  With an emphasis 
on the recruitment of foreign fighters from distinct regions, the branding that 
al-Adnani uses creates waves of media attention—both positive and negative 
in tone—and increases the overall reputation and legitimacy of ISIS.   
 
When competing for funds against similar and regionally-co-located VEOS 
(e.g., al Nusra Front) from revenue sources, ISIS has created a compelling 
brand that is differentiated, endorsed, and increasingly legitimate. The 
present effort highlights empirical relationships that indicate that marketing 
matters for VEOs, and there may be early indicators of which VEOs will gain 
momentum in terms of recruits and funders.  Before turning to the 
implications of these results, however, it is important to discuss the 
limitations of the present effort.  
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First, the authors only had access to secondary sources to assess marketing 
impact.  While examining reactions from actual recruits and funders based on 
efforts to differentiate brand and reputation would have added more validity 
to our findings, the method of inferring impact based on objective indices 
(e.g., number of talented recruits, diversity of fundraising sources) has been 
used extensively in the broader strategy and organizational literature to assess 
marketing impact.  Nonetheless, future laboratory-based studies should 
examine reaction-level data from individuals after viewing marketing 
campaigns from VEOs to gain a richer understanding of how such efforts to 
highlight innovation, brand, and reputation influence at the individual level.  
 
Related to this limitation, this study only examined correlations among the 
branding and performance facets coded here.  Though more complex models 
may reveal intricacies among the data such as mediated relationships, the 
authors were hesitant to draw causal directions without meeting the criteria 
for inferring causation from traditional laboratory research.  Future studies 
may consider examining these constructs using time series data in case 
studies or small samples, in order to begin testing directional relationships 
among metrics examined here. 
 
Second, the present study only examined one organizational strategy—
malevolent innovation of attacks—as a precursor to brand and reputation.  
However, signaling theory dictates that there are a number of approaches that 
organizations can use to increase the status of their brand and reputation.  
For example, organizations with “celebrity CEOs” tend to have more media 
attention due to the relative inimitability of that strategic resource.27  Thus, it 
may hold that VEOs with leaders who are unique (i.e., making efforts to 
differentiate themselves from other leaders) also have a strategic advantage to 
be leveraged in organizational marketing efforts.  Future studies should 
broaden their examination of other organizational strategies to heighten VEO 
brand and reputation.  For instance, though this article did not examine social 
media use as a component of this research, a recent social network analysis of 
twitter feeds managed by ISIS revealed that social media has been 
instrumental in driving communication between core ISIS leadership and 
local and foreign fighters.28  Other research has cited the increasing 
popularity of YouTube and Instagram among VEOs to share video content, 
                                                     
27  Violina P. Rindova, Timothy G. Pollock and Mathew L. A. Hayward, “Celebrity Firms: 
The Social Construction of Market,” Academy of Management Review 31:1 (2006): 50-
71. 
28 Jytte Klausen, “Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign 
Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38:1 (2015): 1-22. 
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departing from the historical trend to release video content to traditional 
media outlets (i.e., news outlets).29  Therefore, as the communication medium 
for conventional organizations evolves to include popular technology 
platforms, VEOs may transition to similar tactics in order to build an online 
reputation and to recruit new generations of fighters.  These platforms also 
offer opportunities for advancements in counter-messaging from 
governments seeking to dissuade sympathy for VEO missions. 
 
Conclusion and Implications for Counterterrorism 
Despite these limitations, conclusions from the present effort yielded at least 
three important implications for counterterrorism.  First, malevolent 
innovation, as measured by attack cruelty above and beyond current norms 
that is executed in a novel and surprising way, is one important way that 
VEOs market themselves.  By creating the impression that they are able to 
execute coordinated and sophisticated attacks, they create a brand that is seen 
as legitimate, differentiated, and unique.  In addition, the novelty of attacks 
cannot be underestimated in terms of impact; resulting media attention—
both positive and negative—can lead to potential recruits having a greater 
affinity for the organization, as witnessed by the recent foreign fighter 
phenomenon with ISIS.  It may be that the increased media attention and 
firm legitimacy garnered after they leveraged increasingly sophisticated and 
cruel attacks created a cognitive opening among sympathizers for recruiters to 
persuade individuals to join the organization.  Thus, an important implication 
of this work is that when VEOs send messages of rarity, inimitability, and 
novelty via marketing of cruel attacks, they may also be more likely to grow in 
size and long-term funding security over time.  VEO branding and reputation 
efforts can be used as other indices for threat assessment given this finding.  
 
Second, any media may be “good media” for a VEO.  While conventional 
studies of branding have indicated that the more positive in tone different 
media reports are, the greater increase in funding, the results of the present 
effort indicate that negative tone is most related to long-term fundraising 
viability.  This was a surprising finding as it seems that unusually cruel 
attacks and the negative media coverage that follows seems to marginalize 
more moderate followers and thus likely dampen donations from such 
sources.  However, the converse appears to be found in the present results; 
attack cruelty and malevolent innovation was strongly related to negative 
media reports and also to long-term fundraising sources (e.g., the acquisition 
                                                     
29 Gabriel Weimann, New Terrorism and New Media (Washington, D.C.: Commons Lab 
of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2014). 
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of legitimate business, member donations).  The implications for 
understanding the relationship between financiers of terrorism and acts of 
terrorism are important; it may be that the psychological impact of attacks 
(e.g., the video-taped beheadings by ISIS created a global media buzz about 
the organization) sends a message to investors similar to the way pricing and 
product design send signals to investors in conventional organizations of firm 
viability and likely sustainability.  
 
Finally, while marketing theory can be used to understand how VEOs brand 
and increase their reputation among recruits and investors, it stands to 
reason that it also can be used to develop counter-messaging and counter-
narratives for VEO recruitment and fundraising.  When VEOs engage in 
attacks that show a high degree of malevolent innovation, publicizing the 
rarity, complexity, and sophistication of these attacks serves as a marketing 
campaign for the organization.  Thus, it seems that a counter-narrative that 
denigrates the organizational legitimacy (e.g., highlighting similarity among 
VEOs, downplaying unique/novel attacks) would counter the swell of 
enthusiasm that a ‘Chief Media Officer’ like al-Adnani seeks to create.  In 
addition, capitalizing on “branding mistakes” of VEOs may also prove useful 
for countering violent extremism in social media.  
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